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S/S-MR. TARNOFF

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TAGS: PEPR

NOTES	
Cat. A	...
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Cat. C	...
Reviewed by:	<i>John Brown</i>
Date:	28 Jan 1982

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S TALKS WITH GROMYKO ON CTB, CAT,
INDIAN OCEAN AND MIDDLE EAST

1. SUMMARY - THE SECRETARY CONFIRMED OUR SUPPORT FOR A COMPLETE TEST BAN, SAID WE ASSUMED THE TREATY WOULD BE FOR THREE YEARS AND NOTED WE WOULD BE PRESENTING A NEW PROPOSAL ON NUMBERS AND LOCATION OF NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS AT GENEVA. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT EITHER THREE OR FIVE YEARS WAS SATISFACTORY AND LOOKED FORWARD TO RECEIVING OUR PROPOSALS ON SEISMIC STATIONS. ON CONVENTIONAL ARM TRANSFERS GROMYKO CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIETS FAVORED PURSUING THE TALKS AND HOPED FOR SOME AGREEMENT AT THE NEXT ROUND. GROMYKO RAISED THE INDIAN OCEAN NEGOTIATIONS. WARNKE EXPLAINED WE HAD DELAYED SETTING A DATE FOR RESUMPTION BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET BUILDUP, CONNECTED WITH CONFLICT IN THE HORN. THE SECRETARY COUNTERED

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GROMYKO'S STANDARD JUSTIFICATION BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THE SOVIET NAVAL , , ESSENCE HAD BEEN REDUCED AND SAID WE WOULD BE IN TOUCH SOON ON RESUMING THE TALKS. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, THE SECRETARY OUTLINED THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS' AND

DESCRIBED ARAB REACTIONS ENCOUNTERED ON HIS TRIP. GRUMYKO WAS CRITICAL IN A BLAND PRO FORMA RESPONSE ALONG STANDARD LINES, CONCLUDING THAT THE ARABS WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN "IMPOSED OR ONE-SIDED" SOLUTION. END SUMMARY.

2. THE SECRETARY TOLD GROMYKO THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED HIM TO CONVEY HIS DESIRE TO MOVE AHEAD ON THE CTB TALKS AND TO CONFIRM THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN OUR SUPPORT FOR A COMPLETE TEST BAN. THE SECRETARY SAID OUR NEGOTIATING TEAM IN GENEVA HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PRESS FORWARD ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE TREATY WOULD HAVE A THREE-YEAR DURATION. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO VERIFICATION AND ESPECIALLY THE NEED FOR AGREEMENT ON AN EFFECTIVE NATIONAL SEISMIC STATION NETWORK, DURING THE CURRENT ROUND OUR DELEGATION WOULD OFFER A NEW PROPOSAL ON THE NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS OF NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS THAT WOULD SUIT A THREE-YEAR TREATY. IT WAS OUR HOPE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD GIVE AN EARLY AND FORTHCOMING RESPONSE TO THIS AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE US SEISMIC STATION PROPOSAL.

3. WARNKE ADDED THAT ONE FACTOR WHICH HAD DELAYED THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PAST WAS UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE DURATION OF THE TREATY. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD TAKEN THE POSITION THAT IT COULD NOT ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE NUMBER OF STATIONS UNTIL DURATION OF THE TREATY WAS KNOWN. HE HOPED THAT AFTER THE US DELEGATION TABLES ITS REVISED PROPOSAL, THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD GIVE

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POSITIVE CONSIDERATION TO THIS PROPOSAL, NOW THAT THREE-YEARS APPEARS TO BE AGREED.

4. GROMYKO SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WERE FIRMLY FOR A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND ASKED OUR POSITION. THE SECRETARY CONFIRMED AGAIN UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THIS WAS OUR POSITION. GROMYKO HOPED THAT OUR NEW PROPOSALS WOULD BE REASONABLE AND WOULD LEAD TO AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD INJECT A POSITIVE BREATH INTO THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE AS A WHOLE. HE ADDED THAT EITHER A THREE-YEAR OR A FIVE-YEAR DURATION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS.

5. THE SECRETARY TOLD GROMYKO THAT THE PRESIDENT AND HE HAD BEEN CLOSELY FOLLOWING THE TALKS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE

WE ATTACHED TO THESE TALKS AND THAT WE LOOKED FORWARD TO THE NEXT SESSION IN DECEMBER. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT GROMYKO WOULD GIVE THEM HIS PERSONAL SUPPORT. GROMYKO NOTED THAT UP TO NOW OUR NEGOTIATORS HAD BEEN DISCUSSING PRINCIPLES AND HAD NOT YET TACKLED QUESTIONS OF A PRACTICAL NATURE. THE SECRETARY TOLD HIM THAT AT THE NEXT ROUND WE EXPECTED TO DEAL WITH THESE QUESTIONS ON A REGIONAL BASIS AND THUS PERHAPS MAKE PRACTICAL PROGRESS. GROMYKO CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE DEFINITELY IN FAVOR OF CONTINUING THESE TALKS BECAUSE THEY CONSIDERED CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO BE OF GREAT POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. HE HOPED THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO SIDES AT THE NEXT ROUND WILL HAVE BEEN GIVEN THOROUGH AND PURPOSEFUL POSITIONS ON THE BASIS OF WHICH SOME AGREEMENT COULD BE ACHIEVED. THE SECRETARY TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE COMMITTED TO CONTINUE THESE TALKS AND WOULD INSTRUCT OUR NEGOTIATORS APPROPRIATELY.

6. GROMYKO ASKED WHY THE UNITED STATES HAD COMPLETELY

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ENDED OUR DISCUSSION OF INDIAN OCEAN ARMS RESTRAINT. WARNKE REPLIED THAT DURING THE LAST ROUND IN BERN IN FEBRUARY, SIGNIFICANT DISAGREEMENTS HAD SURFACED IN CONNECTION WITH SOVIET CONDUCT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. WE FELT THAT THE SOVIET ARMS SUPPLY AND NAVAL BUILDUP IN THAT AREA WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF OUR TALKS. ACCORDINGLY WE HAD NOT SET A DATE FOR RESUMPTION AT THE COMPLETION OF THE BERN ROUND. AT PRESENT THE ARMS CONTROL AGENDA WAS RATHER FULL AND WE HAD THEREFORE NOT ARRIVED AT A DATE FOR RESUMPTION. WE STILL BELIEVED THAT AGREEMENT AIMED AT PUTTING AN END TO THE ARMS RACE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WAS A DESIRABLE OBJECTIVE. THE PRESIDENT HAD EXPRESSED HIS INTEREST IN A PUBLIC STATEMENT, AND THEREFORE WE HOPED TO AGREE ON A DATE FOR RESUMPTION IN THE NOT-TOO-DISTANT FUTURE.

7. GROMYKO REJECTED WARNKE'S EXPLANATION OF THE REASONS FOR INTERRUPTING THE TALKS. HE FELT IT WAS NOT CONVINCING, POINTING OUT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD REDUCED AND EVENTUALLY ENDED THEIR ARMS SUPPLY TO SOMALIA WHEN SOMALIA COMMITTED AGGRESSION AGAINST ETHIOPIA. IN RESPONSE, THE SECRETARY RECALLED THAT AT THAT TIME THE NUMBER OF SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN HAD INCREASED BY ONE-THIRD. THIS WAS INCONSISTENT WITH OUR AIM OF LIMITING THE NUMBER OF VESSELS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. THE SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE NUMBER OF SOVIET VESSELS HAD BEEN REDUCED SINCE THEN AND WAS NOW AT ABOUT THE SAME LEVEL AS BEFORE THE MASSIVE SOVIET SUPPORT EFFORT FOR ETHIOPIA. WHEN GROMYKO BROUGHT UP DIEGO GARCIA, THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE NUMBER OF OUR VESSELS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WAS STABLE AND TOOK HIM TO TASK ON THE BERBERRA/ASMARA AND SOUTH YEMEN SOVIET BASES. THE DIS-

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DISCUSSION CONCLUDED BY MY TELLING HIM THAT WE WOULD BE IN TOUCH SOON TO SET A NEW DATE FOR RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS.

THE SECRETARY THEN TURNED THE DISCUSSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST. HE EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THE MESSAGE PRESIDENT CARTER HAD SENT TO BREZHNEV AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CAMP DAVID MEETINGS HAD NOT BEEN DELIVERED UNTIL MONDAY AFTERNOON. IN THAT MESSAGE THE PRESIDENT HAD DESCRIBED THE EVENTS AT CAMP DAVID AND THE RESULTS OF THOSE MEETINGS.

GRUMYKO ASKED THE SECRETARY WHAT ATTITUDE TO THE CAMP DAVID "DEAL" HE HAD ENCOUNTERED ON THE PART OF SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN. THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED AT LENGTH THE REACTIONS OF THE LEADERS OF EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES. GRUMYKO THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR THE INFORMATION AND PROCEEDED TO CRITICIZE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS. HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION DISAPPROVED OF AND, IN FACT, CONDEMNED THEM. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THEY REPRESENTED A STEP TOWARD PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE FELT THAT CONSIDERATIONS OF A TEMPORARY NATURE HAD PREVAILED AND THAT A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST COULD BE ACHIEVED ONLY BY RETURNING ALL THE LAND TAKEN FROM THE ARABS AND BY SATISFYING THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS. HE CLAIMED THAT "GYPT WAS NOW ISOLATED. ON THE WHOLE, THE ARAB WORLD WAS UNITED IN OPPOSING THE CONCEPT THAT ARAB LANDS COULD BELONG TO SOMEONE ELSE AND IN ADVOCATING THAT THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BE INSURED. HE BELIEVED THAT IN THE END THE ARAB PEOPLE AND THE ARAB WORLD WOULD WIN. AS TO WHEN AND IN WHAT SPECIFIC FORM, THAT COULD NOT BE FORESEEN AT PRESENT. HE WAS SURE, HOWEVER, THAT THE ARABS WOULD NOT RECONCILE THEMSELVES TO LOSING THEIR LANDS OR TO AN IMPOSED OR ONE-SIDED SOLUTION. THIS WAS STRICTLY A PRO FORMA RESPONSE DELIVERED WITHOUT ENTHUSIASM.

10. THE SECRETARY REBUTTED HIS ARGUMENTS IN DETAIL AND

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